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Overconfidence on the part of bankers and regulators in mechanical risk management 
models is an important and distinctive driver of bank failures in the current crisis.  This 
paper illustrates the process by drawing on brief case studies of a handful of the biggest 
failures and losses.  There are significant implications for a more holistic and less 





Presented at  
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago & European Central Bank Conference 
“The Credit Market Turmoil of 2007-8” 
 




phonohan@tcd.ie.   BANK FAILURES: THE LIMITATIONS OF RISK MODELLING 
 
 
1.  Introduction and Summary 
 
This paper argues that overconfidence on the part of bankers and regulators in 
mechanical risk management models is an important and distinctive driver of bank 
failures in the current crisis.  Following an introduction which explains why this matters 
and how it is central to the crisis, Section 2 presents case studies of individual bank 
failures and losses in which this overconfidence and its consequences are illustrated.  
Each of the chosen cases illustrates one of the four distinctive failure categories in the 
early phase of the crisis: the diversified survivors; those too opaque to survive market 
doubts;  those that gambled and lost; and over-leveraged mortgage lenders. Apart from 
the first category, which is represented by a large bank that lost an amount roughly 
equivalent to its pre-crisis capital, but survived by raising new capital, the remainder of 
the examples are banks that had to be intervened with fiscal support. Section 3 briefly 
notes the main dimensions of risk that prove harder to model accurately than is generally 
believed.   Section 4 reviews containment and resolution policy as applied in these cases, 
and discusses the fiscal costs already identified and provided for: so far these are 
surprisingly small, but they will rise.  Section 5 concludes with some old but highly 
relevant quotations that point to the significant implications for a more holistic and less 
mechanical approach to risk management and prudential regulation. 
 
*  *  *  
As much as macroeconomic developments exogenous to the banking system condition 
the nature, timing and, to a degree, the extent of the ongoing banking crisis, and although 
the banking difficulties, and the responses thereto, engender costs and consequences for 
the wider macroeconomic system, it is events and decisions at banks and other financial 
intermediaries  that are at its heart.  Understanding what has gone wrong in the 
institutions that have failed or have suffered severe losses can help the containment effort 
(which is still in progress at the time of writing), as well as making sure that the 
resolution effort and the inevitable reforms of regulation and supervisory practice 
actually serve to reduce the likelihood or severity of future systemic crises. 
 
One approach to commentary on the current financial intermediary crisis is to stress 
similarities and parallels to crises of the past.  Such an approach highlights lessons of the 
past that have not been learnt and which have returned to impose heavy losses on market 
participants and government budgets.  And goodness knows there are enough such 
features evident in current events (Brunnermeier, 2008).
1  Examples would be: the 
problematic incentive structures within financial firms with their bias towards excessive 
risk-taking; the tendency of lenders to neglect the correlation in price movements of 
different real estate collaterals, whether residential, commercial or industrial; the opacity 
of financial intermediaries and the consequent potential evanescence of their access to 
credit.  Disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring) is alive and well.  In fact, Kashyap, 
                                                 
1 Some oft-heard nostrums are as untrue this time as they have in the past: for example the supposed need 
to avoid maturity mismatch or the use of derivatives. 
  2Rajan and Stein (2008), echoing other authors, remark that “a breakdown of incentives 
and risk control systems within banks” explains why banks held such problematic assets. 
 
It would be discouraging to simply conclude that the lessons of the past had not been 
learnt,  That all that is needed is to re-read Minsky and Fisher and Bagehot and for 
regulators and bankers to do a better job of applying their profession’s conventional 
wisdom.  We need to dig further to try to understand why these failures occurred.  In fact, 
like viruses, banking crises display small but crucial mutations on each return.  It is these 
mutations which mean that even experienced and well-trained risk managers who believe 
they have insulated their systems against the causes of crisis can be caught out by its 
emergence in a slightly different guise.   
 
Crisis Cassandras bemoan the fact that the optimists in a booming economy are wrong 
when they dismiss parallels with past excesses with the over-confident assertion that 
“this time it will be different” (Shiller, 2006, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  Unfortunately, 
they are right, but not in a good way: this time it is that the risks will be subtly different, 
so that risk management geared to combat the last crisis may be ineffective, resulting in 
losses and failures that are all too reminiscent of the past. 
 
Thus in looking at a handful of the largest intermediary losses and failures, there is much 
to be said for emphasizing what’s different this time around.  I suggest that there are 
three especially distinctive features of this crisis so far, and they are well illustrated by 
the cases in hand.  First is the degree to which business models based on huge volume 
  3with wafer-thin margins have been implicated in major losses.  Second, and closely 
related, there has been an altogether new over-reliance on mechanical models of risk 
(whether credit or liquidity risks).
2  The third distinctive feature must be regarded as 
provisional, since the full tally is not yet in, and a wide range of uncertainty remains 
about it, but so far the overall direct fiscal costs of the crisis have been surprisingly low.   
 
To be sure there are other aspects which characterize this crisis, but I suggest that these 
are at least arguably aspects of what I have suggested as being particularly distinctive this 
time, or else they are not all that new after all.   
 
For example, the originate-to-distribute model for mortgages is certainly a key and 
damaging aspect of what we have recently seen – and has been damaging to the borrower 
in a way that may appear new.  But in a larger sense the problems with the originate-to-
distribute model are essentially the same as that of the skewed incentive packages offered 
to many traders now and to loan officers in the not-so-distant past.  Much as the 
mortgage originators don’t hold the mortgages on their books, so the loan officer often 
wasn’t around to see their poorly-underwritten loan books coming unstuck.  And how 
different is the distress of the evicted borrower who has been oversold a mortgage from 
that of the developing country sovereign on whom petrodollar loans were pressed in the 
1970s? 
 
                                                 
2 Calomiris suggests that risk models were being used to provide “plausible deniability” for conflicted 
agents and intermediaries rather than being truly believed as risk management tools. 
(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1561). 
  4Some observers have dubbed this the “structured finance crisis” (cf. Mason, 2008), and 
that is not a bad choice of distinguishing characteristic. Indeed the financial engineering 
revolution which enabled the use of complex instruments to pool and hedge risks has 
been a key driving force setting the scene for the subsequent failures.  It drove growth in 
financial intermediation as it offered low-cost automation of rik management functions 
thereby allowing new markets, especially retail markets to be reached.  But surely those 
who foresee only a moderation and improvement—not an abandonment—of structured 
finance are correct.   
 
Instead, it has been the over-reliance on what has proved to be unrealistically simple 
mechanical risk management models that has turned structured finance into the lethal 
weapon it has become.  It was only because (at some level) risk-takers believed that the 
models were good enough that the structures became so complex and opaque.  In fact as 
we all know, the models embody many crude approximations at many levels.   
 
Banking is a volume business, and the 20
th Century saw a historic rise in leverage 
however measured.  But the explosion of gross positions and gross transactions that has 
been seen in the past two decades takes the risk pyramid into new territory.  There is 
nothing inherently wrong with this, but it does place risk-models under severe strain.  
Slight errors in the models are amplified by the volume of transactions.  The cliff-edge 
type consequences of model error in some structured transactions only makes this worse 
(cf. Joint Forum, 2008).  Likewise basis risk can assume an enormous institution-
engulfing scale.  This is what we see in the case studies.  In principle, those risks could 
  5be rewarded sufficiently well to justify the capital cushion that would be needed to truly 
give adequate assurance of solvency.  But in practice the contracted margins have too 
often been slender indeed, capital assigned zero or negligible and the risks scarcely 
noticed let alone adequately assessed. 
 
The reliance on models – at least by smaller participants – was indirect: in effect by 
relying on rating agencies, they were trusting the models used by the raters.  They were 
also trusting the raters.  Calomiris (2008) has stressed the agency problems involved 
here, as did many ex ante (cf. Honohan, 2001).  I am proposing, though, that agency was 
not the only problem, but instead the fact that market participants were dazzled by the 
new technology and believed it would work far better than was ever going to be possible.  
 
This is not the place to rehearse all of the failures associated with the ratings process, but 
it is clear that one of the fundamental problems was the widespread belief that the risk 
profile of any financial structure could be adequately modelled with a variant of standard 
techniques.  Alas, the imperfections of these models were systematically exploited in the 
design of the structures in a process that, given that the raters did not take explicit 
account of the fact that the models were not perfect, necessarily flattered at least some 
structures.  To take one important example, consider the by-now well-known fact that 
underestimating the default correlation between components of the underlying bundle of 
securities backing an ABS structure can lead to a dramatic increase in the default rate of 
senior tranches, while actually lowering default rates of the most junior tranches.  When 
the senior tranches are being held by risk-averse investors seeking a few basis points of 
  6additional yield, such small errors can be disastrous for intermediary solvency (while 
potentially favouring those who hold the “toxic waste”—if average default rates are 
correctly predicted). 
 
Unwarranted confidence in risk models also had a systemic effect on market participants’ 
expectations regarding the likely availability of funding liquidity.  If everyone’s risk 
models were so good, one could ignore the negligible chance of a contagious loss of 
market confidence leading to a drying-up of funding liquidity to a solvent bank.  Hence 
the over-leveraging occurred in liquidity as well as on the other side of the balance sheet.  
 
While the asset write-downs and estimated future credit losses of the events of the past 
eighteen months are appreciable, it is noteworthy that most of the largest individual bank 
losses reported up to September 2008 had been absorbed by existing capital and that 
almost all of the banks concerned have been able to replenish their depleted capital—
albeit not without some hiccups and with considerable dilution of existing shareholders.  
Partly this reflects growing worldwide concentration of international banking: a loss 40 
or 50 times that which brought down Barings bank certainly hurts even one of the 
world’s top dozen banks by assets or capital, but is far from fatal. Partly, though, it 
reflects the fact that, so far, actual and even projected loan losses represent a much 
smaller percentage of the GDP of the major countries across whose banks the losses have 
been distributed, than has been experienced in many previous crises. 
 
  7A corollary is that, although Central Banks made substantial liquidity loans, often backed 
with securities of lower credit quality than had been customary, government and its 
agencies had, until September 2008, absorbed or committed relatively little of the direct 
costs of bank failure.  The asset purchase scheme awaiting approval by the US Congress 
at the time of writing (end September 2008) heralded a new phase inasmuch as it put the 
government in the front line for absorbing losses. 
 
Furthermore, the indirect costs of the crisis are likely to be appreciable.  It is true that a 
very substantial portion of the capital lost in the banking system has been replenished—
albeit at an appreciable discount to bank equity prices that prevailed in the first part of 
2007. But, in shocked reaction to the realization that confidence in risk management 
models, and in reliable access to liquidity was misplaced, bank managements have 
tightened credit standards and contracted credit on a broad front. This is already 
contributing to a broad economic downturn that will increase unemployment, reduce 
personal income, shrink profits (and lead to failures) of non-financial firms.  But that is 
not my story today.
3   
 
Experience of previous crises shows that the bad news does not  all come at first, and 
instead emerges over a period of several quarters.  At the time of writing it would require 
heroic optimism to assert that there will be no further surprises.  Indeed stock prices and 
interbank interest rates imply further unannounced losses embedded in bank balance 
                                                 
3 But is the downturn caused by the banking system or are both endogenous consequences of other factors 
such as geopolitical instability, changes in relative prices associated with shifting global production 
patterns, and inappropriate monetary policy?  Probably banking system deficiencies have had a relatively 
larger causal or amplifying effect in this crisis than in others, but this topic is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
  8sheets and activities, but their location not known.  In particular, a prolonged growth 
recession will deepen loan losses unrelated to the US subprime and Alt-A mortgage 
markets and their counterparts in other countries.  Non-mortgage related loan losses are 
already turning up.   
 
There are policy implications.  For all that rules may trump discretion in monetary 
policy, the opposite seems true for banking risk and bank regulation.  The rules of Basel 
2 are no better than those being applied by market participants.
4  Quite apart from the 
pro-cyclical and herding effects which rules-based regulation may induce (as has been 
argued for example by Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994, Goodhart and Persaud, 2008, Shin 
et al, 2005, and others—albeit challenged for example by Jorion, 1999), the problem that 
the rules do not represent a sufficiently precise tool for risk management must be 
acknowledged.  The Basel Committee’s working groups are currently revising and 
adapting the rules to acknowledge some of the most glaring omissions, but this is an 
effort that has no end.  The limitations of the rules need to be recognized and a greater 
discretionary and judgmental element restored to risk management.
5  That will often 
mean requiring more capital than the rules calculate and that in turn raises numerous 
complexities about level playing fields, the political pressure on and even corruption of 
regulators (a point stressed by Caprio et al., 2005) and  makes different and in some 
respects greater intellectual demands on risk managers, both regulators and regulated.  
                                                 
4 Accounting rules too are full of oddities that can mislead, such as the valuation of a company’s own debt 
at discounted market value in computing profits (FT “Fair value debt profits surprise analysts.” August 8, 
2008), and the backward-looking nature of loan-loss reserving in IFRS.  
5 Note that models that are good enough for private sector decisions may not be good enough for public 
regulation.  The risk–return trade-off that each is conducting is complementary to, not the same as, the 
other.  For example, beyond the total probability of insolvency, the probability density for payoffs in the 
insolvency zone may be of no interest to the owner of a financial intermediary. 
  9The higher capital and heightened sensitivity to risk that has come with the Basel process 
over the past quarter century have helped reduce the cost to the government’s accounts 
from the crisis. Ensuring that this continues will require greater use of Pillar 2: 
supervisory discretion to add supplementary capital charges to those generated by 
formula. 
  102.  Four examples 
To provide more concrete substance to these observations, we now turn to a selection of 
the most important losses and failures. I have not chosen simply the largest losses, (as 
logged, for example by Bloomberg, Annex Table 2).  Instead I have chosen ten 
intermediaries distinguished both by their scale, by the degree to which they have been 
documented and by their novelty or salience for illustrating some of the major features of 
the crisis.   
 
We begin with the important category of banks that did make and report huge losses but 
survived to date without government assistance. They did not fail and this they managed 
to do because they were sufficiently large and diversified to have been able to raise 
additional capital to replace that eroded by credit losses.  Our example here is UBS; 
numerous other cases exist from Citibank (which experienced the largest individual 
reported loss) down.  
 
Every crisis sweeps away some incompetent, reckless or corrupt bankers and their banks.  
This is our second category of: referred to for convenience as those that simply gambled 
and lost.  The example we take here is Sachsen LB, and we mention some other which 
fall into the same kind of area: IndyMac, IKB Deutsche Industriebank, Carlyle Capital 
and Roskilde Bank.  
 
Then there is the important category of firms that proved too opaque to survive in the 
market and ran out of liquidity.   Our example of this type is the simplest one: Northern 
  11Rock—indeed one of its misfortunes was to face liquidity problems early on when the 
market was more easily alarmed.  Much more complex and opaque cases were the 
investment banks Bear Stearns (rescued) and Lehmans (not rescued).  Perhaps Fortis, 
Dexia and Hypo, which received sizable government rescue injections in late September, 
2008 are also in this category. Mention is also made of AIG – not a bank, but caught up 
in the crisis through insuring banks (notably with credit default swaps) and falling likely 
into the “too opaque category”. 
 
The final category, and one which seems likely to grow, is mortgage lenders whose main 
problem was to be too leveraged in a weak property market.  We discuss the two largest 
US Government-sponsored financial agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Other cases 
mentioned under this heading are Washington Mutual, which became the biggest 
regulated bank to fail in US history in September, 2008 and Bradford and Bingley, 
intervened by the UK government at the end of that month.  
 
Case A: “Diversified Survivor” UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland)  
Unlike the other main cases examined, UBS has not failed and displays no likelihood of 
failing; no government support whatsoever has been provided or has been in prospect.  
This is despite reporting losses in excess of US$ 40 billion – much larger than any of the 
others.  The reason is not only that UBS is a much larger entity, indeed it is one of the 
world’s largest banks (being ranked 2
nd in the world at end-2006 by total assets and 20
th 
in the world by equity capital in Euromoney’s mid-2007 listing and one of about 15 
groups classified by the Bank of England as Large and Complex Financial 
  12Intermediaries, LCFIs), but also because it has been subject both to the standard 
international regime of capital adequacy (Basel I and now Basel II) and to the market 
discipline that demands even more capital from banks that wish to source uninsured 
funding in the market.  Nevertheless, it has been a fairly close-run thing.  Thus, at mid-
2007, before the crisis broke, UBS had CHF 51 billion equal to US$ 42 billion of capital.  
By end-March 2008, this had eroded to CHF 16 billion (=US$ 16 billion) before capital 
raising efforts to offset losses incurred brought the total back up to CHF 44 billion (=US$ 
44 billion) by mid-2008.
6 
 
UBS’ experience: large losses related to acquisition of mainly US-based MBS, is clearly 
similar in several respects to the large losses made by other LCFIs.  It has been better 
documented so far and therefore serves as a useful exemplar of a half a dozen other cases 
of large losses by large banks. 
 
Even though the losses could be and were absorbed by the shareholders, they represented 
a severe blow for a bank which prided itself on – and was widely admired for – its risk 
management.
7 And they occurred and were reported early in the crisis and cannot be 
blamed on a generalized downturn.  In fact, as is revealed by a report to the shareholders 
following an independent consultant’s post mortem (UBS, 2008) the failure must clearly 
be laid at the door of the risk management system itself.  It was not sufficiently elaborate 
                                                 
6 The ability of banks to replenish lost capital is a crucial element – necessary but not sufficient – in 
limiting the credit crunch consequences of losses.  This aspect was perhaps understressed in the important 
analyses of Greenlaw et al.. (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2008), though the increasing cost and difficulty 
that banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland and  Bradford and Bingley – both of whose rights issues were 
largely left in the hands of the underwriters –  and the GSEs have had in replenishing capital as bank equity 
prices continued to drift down during the crisis may have made this neglect realistic. 
7 For example, winning Euromoney magazine’s “Global Best Risk Management House” award for 
excellence in 2005. 
  13to capture the full dimensionality of the risks being undertaken by this complex 
institution: short cuts were taken in the interest of having prompt information available, 
but these short cuts could be and were systematically gamed by ambitious operations 
staff who took very large risks but seem to have structured them in such a way that they 
did not show up at all in the calculation of risk and therefore triggered neither the capital 
charge nor the kinds of trading limits that would have been warranted. 
 
Most of UBS’ losses relate to their portfolio of MBS, many of which were being 
warehoused for sale to other entities.  Evidently, the mark-to-market value of these assets 
fell sharply during 2007.  In broad terms, what appears to have happened – in respect of 
at least some of the losses – is that insurance and derivatives were bought to hedge only 
the amount of variation (known to the traders) to which the portfolio was being stress-
tested.
8  Market fluctuations larger than envisaged in the stress test were not hedged 
(otherwise the profit potential of the positions being taken would have been eliminated).  
In other words, the profits being  booked (in the relevant parts of the business) arose 
primarily because of – and were the reward for – the assumption of catastrophic risk 
outside that envisaged in the stress test.  Senior management understood that certain units 
were taking large positions, but they assumed that the risk models were good enough to 
protect against serious loss.  Perhaps they would have been good enough if not gamed, 
but they were not perfect, and that they were gamed was perhaps inevitable. 
 
                                                 
8 The bank states that “this level of hedging was based on statistical analyses of historical price movements 
that indicated that such protection was sufficient to protect UBS from any losses on the position” (UBS, 
2008, p. 14).  The level of hedging also seems to have been designed to meet internal risk-management 
rules (Hughes et al., 2008). 
  14Indeed, already in 2006-7 the bank’s senior management had coped with an explicit 
attempt by a significant segment of its capital markets staff to escape from the constraints 
of the bank’s austere risk management structures.  Hughes et al. (2008) recounts the 
establishment of a hedge-fund subsidiary whose activities would not be scrutinized by 
the bank’s risk management systems in a detailed way, but only as an equity investment.  
The mis-priced risks soon undertaken by the newly-liberated subsidiary quickly proved 
to be large.  The bank realized its error, reported significant losses and folded the capital 
markets unit back into the normal risk management system. 
 
Huge gross volumes of business built on wafer-thin capital (because of the 
miscalculation of the potential losses) by an entity with access to the world’s best 
financial engineering and mathematical risk models: this makes UBS a prime exhibit for 
our argument that too much unthinking reliance has been placed in the precision of 
mechanical models leading to extraordinary losses when the models prove inadequate. 
 
As in Sachsen bank, senior management has been changed in recent months. The timing 
in relation to the losses is not quite clear, however, the CEO resigned in July 2007, after 
the hedge fund was closed but several months before the really big losses were reported.  
Seven of the eleven members of the Executive Committee were appointed since 
September 2007.  There is a new Chairman since the 2008 AGM, but only one other 
Director is new this year.  
 
Case B: “Too opaque to survive in the market” Northern Rock 
  15Northern Rock, a moderate sized mortgage bank based in the North of England and 
which saw exceptionally rapid growth in the past decade generated the most spectacular 
events of the early stages of the crisis when, on September 14, 2007, retail depositors 
flocked to queue at all of its branches to withdraw their funds. The runwas triggered 
when the announcement of a liquidity support package by the authorities failed to include 
any clear assurance to depositors that their money was safe.
9  At the time, the UK deposit 
insurance system fully guaranteed only the first £2000, plus 90 per cent of the next 
£33,000 of the depositor’s funds – and there was no track record of prompt payment from 
the deposit fund. 
 
Like Sachsen bank, NR’s immediate difficulties arose from their inability to rollover 
short-term wholesale funding on which they relied very heavily as part of their overall 
lending-driven growth strategy.  The growth had been vigorous: total assets under 
management grew from just over £20 billion at end-1999 to over £100 billion at end-
2006. All but £11 billion of this growth was funded through wholesale resources: retail 
deposits equalled only 22 per cent of the total by end-2006.  Indeed, so good was NR 
thought to be at this end of its business that it received the International Financing 
Review’s prestigious “Financial Institution Group Borrower of the Year” award for 2006.  
And we know that its internal risk-rating procedures were also highly considered by its 
regulator, the UK FSA, because earlier in 2007 it was granted the Basel 2 “waiver” 
                                                 
9 The tripartite statement by the Bank of England, the Treasury and the Financial Services Authority (the 
regulator) could have been read as indicating that the liquidity support was conditional on Northern Rock 
having sufficient “appropriate” collateral, and that the FSA’s opinion that Northern Rock was solvent was 
not shared by the other two authorities.  The statement is at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2007/090.htm  
  16allowing it to lower its capital requirement by calculating it on the basis of internal 
ratings.  
 
Although their operations did involve securitizations funded through special purpose 
vehicles, constructed for the purpose of generating and separately-financing highly-rated 
tranches of MBS, the underlying assets being financed were in the main originated by 
NR themselves (rather than being part of the US subprime market).
10  NR were popular 
with their borrowers and there has been little suggestion of the kinds of abuses involving 
pressure sales, fraudulent valuations and documentation and the like associated with the 
US sub-prime market.  But with market sentiment moving against MBS and spreads 
rising, NR were particularly badly hit by funding difficulties. Even if they could rollover 
the funding at prevailing rates in the market, the higher spreads were on such volumes of 
business that the whole bank would become severely loss-making.  Besides, the market 
was aware of NR’s aggressive lending (which included lending combinations amounting 
to 125 per cent loan-to-value ratio) and inferred that NR’s loan loss ratios would be 
above industry average as the market turned down. 
 
The market’s refusal to rollover the funds sent NR to the Bank of England. The latter was 
at first reluctant to provide accommodation because NR was unable to provide collateral 
to the Bank’s normal standards. Eventually, after a conspicuous delay and public 
statements which accelerated NR’s funding difficulties, the Bank acceded to the largest 
                                                 
10 Note that the accounts of the Special Purpose Entities created to hold the securitized mortgages were 
consolidated line-by-line into NR’s accounts, a practice that was not followed at Sachsen. 
  17liquidity loan provided by any central bank in world history.
11  NR depositors’ funds 
were unconditionally guaranteed by the UK Treasury (which also embarked on an 
overhaul of the deposit insurance scheme with the intention of increasing coverage). 
 
Continued high funding costs, continued falls in house prices in the North of England 
and rising delinquencies made sourcing new equity for NR difficult.  Eventually it was 
taken into “temporary” public ownership (shareholders are to be compensated on the 
basis of an independent valuation), and some £3 billion of the Bank of England’s loan 
was converted into equity provided by the UK Treasury. Already the losses reported in 
the first half of 2008 amounted to £0.6 billion -- about two-fifths of end-2007 equity. 
 
Underestimating the volatility in the cost and availability of wholesale funding was a 
serious error, which led NR to leave itself very exposed.  Given its rollover needs, even 
the £5.9 billion it had in cash in early September, 2008 counted for little. It could be said 
that part of the NR’s woes were attributable to the self-fulfilling fears of wholesale 
funders: by withholding their funding they made NR’s business model unsustainable.  
But at a deeper level, the model itself was highly vulnerable, with no fall-back position.  
Even a small deterioration in its funding costs was always on the cards.  Once again a 
mechanical model—this time of liquidity availability rather than market or credit risks—
had been exploited beyond its range of reliability.  Not only did the bank build a very 
large business on fragile funding, but the business it built embodied very evident credit 
                                                 
11 By end-2007, NR’s indebtedness to the Bank of England stood at £28.5 billion = US$ 56.9 billion (€ 
38.6 billion). 
  18risks (growth, loan-to-value) that inevitably fed-back on the margin of confidence of its 
wholesale funders. 
 
NR’s capital cushion was also low, and was being pared down as much as possible: 
indeed, the bank’s 2006 Annual Report (published in March 2007) noted with 
satisfaction that the soon-to-be implemented regime of Basel 2 would allow NR to cut 
capital even further (a fact which should give pause to enthusiasts of Basel 2 and those 
who feel that small modifications to the Basel 2 capital adequacy mechanics are all that 
is needed). 
 
It remains to be seen just how well NR’s mortgage book performs through the coming 
years.  Could the firm have survived if it had been able to secure funding on a continuing 
basis at average market rates? This is not yet clear.  
 
Other banks also suffered runs:   
−  Bear Stearns was the biggest victim despite its huge pool of liquidity totalling 
US$ 18 billion just days before it ran out of cash (like other investment banks, its 
liabilities were very short-term in nature).  Its creditors were wholesale 
institutions: when Bear Stearns had lost its credit
12 with them the whole structure 
imploded, as its franchise (in common with that of the other investment banks) 
was based on its credit and its teams of skilled wholesale financiers: the former 
                                                 
12 Aa with the GSEs, there has been the suggestion that speculators, having taken a short position, spread 
rumours about insolvency of Bear Stearns with the intention of driving down the share price.  However, 
restrictions subsequently imposed on short-selling of certain firms’ shares have not resulted in 
outperfomance of those shares since (Brunnermeier, 2008). 
  19was gone, the latter both mobile and ineffective without access to funds) 
(Burrough, 2008; Kelly, 2008).  This failure prompted official intervention, not 
least because of Bear Stearns’ central role as a market maker in the credit default 
swap market.  Interestingly, Bear Stearns subsequently published a balance sheet 
as of February 29, 2008 – just over two weeks before it failed – showing 
shareholders equity at a satisfactory US$ 12 billion: on the face of it, Bear Stearns 
looks like a classic Bagehot-type case, unusual enough in the crises of recent 
years: a solvent bank that became illiquid because of loss of market confidence.  
It will be some time before we can be sure about this.  
−  Lehman Brothers and AIG insurance group are two other complex financial 
institutions which foundered because the market lost confidence in their solvency.  
Lehman’s became unable to secure the continued wholesale financing on which 
its business model, like that of Bear Stearns, relied.  Despite its size and the 
elaborate structure of customer links in its business, the Federal authorities 
decided it was neither too big nor too connected to preclude allowing failure and 
it filed for bankruptcy on September 15
th, 2008, at the start of what was to become 
a week of exceptional market turbulence.
13,14  Later that week, the even larger 
insurance group AIG saw its credit ratings downgraded, triggering significant 
margin calls which gave rise to an immediate requirement for emergency access 
                                                 
13 Several money market mutual funds held Lehman debt at the time of the bankruptcy. One of the largest, 
Reserve Primary saw its net asset value fall consequentially below par value – not a failure event per se, 
but quite exceptional for such funds.  This led within days to the introduction by the authorities of an 
insurance facility for money market funds, as well as other measures to support the high quality asset-
backed commercial paper market through direct official purchases and non-recourse lending to banks 
collateralized by by ABCP acquired effectively at cost from money market funds.  
14 The proposed purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, and of Britain’s HBOS by Lloyd’s Bank 
were the largest other institutional ownership restructurings announced that week.  Emerging economies 
were not exempt from such pressures; for example, KIT Finance, a second tier intermediary in Russia, 
received an emergency injection of funds (less than US$ 1 billion) from State-controlled Gazprombank.  
  20to liquidity.  In this case bankruptcy was averted by the establishment of a special 
revolving loan facility of up to US$85 billion at the extraordinarily high interest 
rate of LIBOR plus 8.5 per cent. (The Fed was also to receive warrants for almost 
80 per cent of AIG’s equity).  If fully drawn, this facility would exceed the 
previous record for an emergency loan by a central bank (currently held by 
Northern Rock).  The interest premium will partly compensate the Fed for credit 
risk, and also provide a strong incentive for AIG to liquidate assets and downsize.  
In the market conditions of mid-September, it was impossible to say whether AIG 
or Lehmans were solvent in underlying asset value terms.  Both proved to be too 
opaque to survive in the market. The decision to rescue one and not the other was 
likely based more on the relative disruptive consequences.   
−  Fortis, which was rescued by a government
15 injection of equity funds at end-
September, 2008 was struggling to digest its purchase of parts of ABN-AMRO; 
the market lost confidence in its ability to come through the turbulent market 
conditions.  Digestion problems with acquisitions also clouded the prospects of 
Wachovia bank, which received open-bank assistance in the form of guarantees 
on its asset portfolio from the FDIC to enable it to be taken over by Citi on Sep 
29
th, 2008.  So this too was a too opaque-to-value case. 
−  Dexia and Hypo RE were wholesale concerns whose reliance on short-term 
funding became a fatal weakness as money markets seized up.  
                                                 
15 In this case it was a coordinated intervention by the governments of Belgium (which was the home 
regulator), Netherland and Luxembourg.  In the case of Dexia, rescued the following day, coordination of 
public sector stakeholders in France, Belgium and Luxembourg was required.  Surprisingly, the fiscal 
coordination was effective, possibly because decisionmakers felt that the banks’ equities were undervalued 
in then current market conditions and that they would therefore stand to make a profit on the intervention. 
  21−  California’s IndyMac (which has been criticized for many loan origination abuses 
in the subprime market) also saw runs when an influential politician indicated 
(correctly) that its survival was in doubt.  Once again the institution lasted only 
days.  In this case, however, it was not a case of a self-fulfilling panic, the 
institution was already deeply insolvent when the run began. Interestingly, many 
of the customers who ran the bank – at evident personal inconvenience – were 
fully insured  by the FDIC whose record in ensuring prompt access to insured 
funds of failed institutions is exemplary. It is not easy to explain this apparently 
irrational behaviour but it does reinforce the idea that limited deposit insurance is 
not a foolproof tool for avoiding runs, but instead serves at best to provide 
political acceptability for bank closures.  Fundamentally, though, IndyMac’s 
weakness was more conventional: poor – if not abusive – underwriting and 
increasing difficulties in onselling mortgages originated.  As such, IndyMac 
arguably belongs more to the next category of failure, the “gambled and lost” 
  
Case C: “Gambled and lost” --  Sachsen Bank 
 
In each case there is a back story, an overall context which made the management error 
more likely; the impact of an external shock larger. 
 
In the case of Leipzig-based Sachsen bank, reports speak of an underperforming bank (it 
was the smallest and newest of the German state banks, set up after German reunification 
in 1992), which had—thanks to EU legislation intended to level the international playing 
  22field for banks within the Union—recently (July 2005) lost the significant competitive 
advantage of a state guarantee of deposits.  Both the suggestion of less than stellar top 
management and boardroom skills combined with a desperate need for a new source of 
profits to allow the bank to survive as a profitable entry are features of this back story 
which help explain why large and growing profits from an offshore affiliate seem to have 
been uncritically welcomed by the bank’s top decisionmakers.   
 
In fact, what the affiliate (based in Dublin’s
16 International Financial Services Centre) 
was doing was not all that different from what many other banks were doing; only its 
scale differed, relative to the scale of the sponsoring bank.  It had established off-balance 
sheet “conduits” to hold mainly US mortgage-backed securities in a volume equivalent to 
about one-third of the parent bank’s balance sheet.  These highly-rated securities were 
financed by short-term borrowing in the market at rates very slightly finer than the 
securities were yielding.
17  The Dublin operation contributed 90 per cent of the Group’s 
total profit in 2006.  The catch, from Sachsen’s point of view, was that the conduits had 
also been given in effect a back-up loan facility from the parent bank Sachsen itself.  
Failure to rollover its borrowings would lead to the conduit calling on Sachsen to provide 
the refinancing.  The scale of the commitment was huge: the eventual rescue involved a 
liquidity injection approaching 25 per cent of the total balance sheet of the parent bank.  
                                                 
16 As it happens, the name of the most problematic of Sachsen’s SIVs, “Ormond Quay”, is the name of the 
riverside street onto which the board room of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
looks out!  
17 As Brunnermeier (2008) notes, the use of structured financial products in the conduit business allowed 
Sachsen to continue to source AAA-rated funding (previously available to it thanks to the government 
guarantee, but which its balance sheet alone would not support). 
  23A reading of Sachsen’s 2007 Annual Report (p. 81) suggests that the risk management 
systems of the bank did not consider this as a credit or liquidity risk, but merely as an 
operational risk, on the argument that only some operational failure could lead to the loan 
facility being drawn down.  As such, it was assigned a very low risk weight attracting 
little or no capital.   
 
Press reports indicate that the German banking regulator BaFin was not altogether happy 
with the risks surrounding the activities of the Dublin affiliate of Sachsen.  It 
commissioned a special on-site study by external consultants KPMG as far back as 
August 2004; who are reported to have made some very critical comments, but who may 
also have been unlucky in their sampling of the funds and conduits, so that they did not 
see the worst of the portfolio (Balzli et al. 2008). 
 
Of course, with repeated downgrades of mortgage-backed securities and the seizing-up of 
European money markets in the late Summer of 2007, the scale and costs of this 
commitment became evident to all.  Conduits could not be refinanced and Sachsen could 
not itself borrow enough in the market to meet its lending commitments to the conduits. 
 
With the prospect of Sachsen failing and official fears that this would result in a 
systemically damaging market reassessment of the credit risk of German financial 
institutions, a pool of public sector banks stepped-in (August 17, 2007) with a temporary 
credit line for the conduits, at a penalty rate.
18 
                                                 
18 At least 50 basis points of penalty (European Commission 2008a); note that this penalty was equivalent 
to 5 percent per annum on the end-2006 capital of the bank. 
  24 
After several months of negotiation, Sachsen was sold to another German state bank, the 
much larger Stuttgart-based LBBW, which will continue Sachsen’s regional SME and 
other business under its old name in its existing regional market, which complements that 
of the purchaser.   
 
Costs and losses: The transactions surrounding the sale of Sachsen and write-downs and 
losses over the past year are quite complex but in broad terms it appears that the owners 
have lost about €1.5 billion from Sachsen’s MBS adventure; a rather small sum, 
compared with some of the other banks (and compared with the scale of the liquidity 
bail-out) but enough to wipe-out the end-2006 book value of Sachsen’s capital.  There is 
still a contingent liability from a new “super-SIV” structure created to hold some of the 
worst-performing parts of mortgage-backed portfolio, totalling €17.3 billion.  This 
structure benefits from a first-loss guarantee of €2.75 billion from the State Government 
of Saxony (which was in effect the controlling owner of Sachsen Bank before the sale).
19  
That guarantee is 2½ times LBBW’s worst case stress-test estimate of the negative value 
of the super-SIV.
20   
   
The crucial error at the heart of Sachsen’s business model was not so much its reliance 
on an underpriced guarantee from parent to off-balance sheet vehicles, but the scale on 
                                                 
19 It held 27 per cent of the equity directly and a further 14 per cent through its share of a consortium. 
20 LBBW and the vendors agreed that the expected loss on the super-SIVwas less than €0.5 billion (though 
this figure is in turn less – maybe much less – than the mark-to-market value of the SIV’s assets at the time 
of the final negotiations) (European Commission 2008a).  In addition, €0.5 billion of other write-downs 
were taken on Sachsen’s books before the sale (European Commission, 2008a).  
  25which these guarantees were made in relation to capital and balance sheet scale.  They 
“bet the bank” on the validity of the ratings and lost.
21   
 
Not only did senior management and the shareholders lose out in the Sachsen bank case 
but, this being a public sector bank, there were political repercussions and the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance of the Saxony Regional Government resigned within 
the year. 
 
Case D: “Overleveraged mortgage lender”-- The GSEs 
I will not provide much background on the two largest US GSEs, FNMA and FHLMC.  
Because of their curious hybrid character, seemingly in the private sector, but established 
under special statute, separately regulated from the rest of the banking system, and with 
their debt benefiting from various regulatory privileges, the systemic risks potentially 
presented by these entities had already been extensively discussed in the literature before 
the crisis broke (cf. Jaffee, 2003; Eisenbeis, Frame and Wall, 2007, Poole, 2007)  In fact, 
by mid-2008, the focus on these two entities had shifted to the scale and nature of the 
likely US government bailout of creditors, and in particular what the prospects were for 
the private shareholders.   
 
                                                 
21 From this point of view the case of the other small German bank IKB is somewhat contrasting.  They 
also acquired MBS both on and off-balance sheet and their crisis was also triggered by a failure (at end-
July 2007) to rollover short-term financing for an off-balance sheet vehicle to which they had guaranteed a 
line of credit which they were unable to deliver.  But IKB had taken much lower-rated tranches: for 
example only 73 per cent of their sizable on-balance sheet MBS were rated AAA or AA.  A rescue led by 
the large development bank KfW (owned by the German Federal government) was organized.  Eventually 
the sale of IKB to a venture capital fund was announced in August 2008; KfW stated that its losses from 
the IKB rescue would be about €8 billion. 
  26In terms of the total value of mortgage-related securities owned or guaranteed, Fannie 
and Freddie are at the other end of the scale from Sachsen, with about US$ 5 trillion, an 
amount equivalent to over one-third of US GDP in 2007.  More than two thirds of this 
relates to guarantees mainly on securitized mortgages packaged by the GSEs out of 
“conforming” (moderately-sized and not sub-prime) mortgages offered to it by other 
market participants; the remainder relates to an on-balance sheet portfolio of mortgage-
backed assets which can and does include nonconforming loans.
22   
 
The on-balance sheet MBS are subject to the risk that the underlying fixed rate 
mortgages will be  prepaid, whether because interest rates have fallen or for other 
reasons.  This risk is hedged by the GSEs’ treasury function through the funding 
instruments and derivatives, but perfect hedging is not practicable leaving the agencies 
with appreciable non-credit risk as well as the credit risk of the underlying mortgages.  
Indeed, the non-credit risk has long been thought the dominant one (Jaffee, 2003; 
Eisenbeis et al., 2007), hence the regulatory capital requirement (leverage)
23 for the on-
balance sheet risks was set much higher (2.5%) than that on the guarantees (0.45%).  
Still, the result is that the GSEs reported stockholder’s equity totalling only US$ 68 
                                                 
22 About 15 per cent of the agencies’ total mortgage book of business relates to sub-prime or Alt-A 
mortgages (CBO, 2008).  
23 The GSEs are subject both to the higher of the leverage requirements as specified in the text and a risk-
based capital which is based on a stress-test and in practice has been lower. (Following accounting 
irregularities uncovered in 2003-4, the GSE regulator OFHEO imposed a temporary surcharge onto these 
requirements; the surcharge was lowered in February 2008).  However, independent modelling by Posner 
and Brown (2005) of Morgan Stanley generated much higher economic capital requirements (of between 
4.5 and 7 per cent) to meet a stand-alone AA rating.  They took account of such modelling uncertainties as 
the likelihood of prepayment depending on turnover in the housing market as well as the costs of hedging 
prepayment risk (convexity). The gap between the regulatory and economic capital measures understates 
the subsidy value of the implicit government guarantee in that the agencies funding costs have been much 
lower than that applying to AA firms.  Thus at August 2008 Standard and Poors gave Fannie Mae a “Risk 
to the Government” rating of just A+, while it was still rating the agency’s long-term debt at AAA. 
  27billion at end-2006 supporting that US$ 5 trillion.  By mid-2008 the total reported equity 
had fallen to US$ 54 billion – supporting an even higher total mortgage book.
24   
 
Sure enough, with the recent turbulence—including volatility and unexpected cross-
instrument correlation patterns—in short-term money markets, there was the potential for 
surprises and losses in the hedging function.
25  But that does not in practice seem to have 
been the main problem causing the deteriorating financial position of the GSEs in 2007-
8.  Of course, while there is no evidence yet that the complex non-credit risks will 
generate losses in excess of the capital allowed for them, it is too early to say that this 
will remain true.  However, according to the accounts up to the first half-year of 2008, it 
seems that credit-related losses both realized and unrealized, were by far the most 
damaging.  Between them, the agencies acknowledge credit-related losses of US$ 16.3 
billion in the 18 months to mid-2008.  So it seems that plain vanilla credit losses on a 
portfolio of largely conforming or prime mortgages have been sufficient to wipe out 
almost all of the capital assigned to credit risk, if we assume that the figure of 0.45 per 
cent applied across the board.   
 
But they also note additional net mark-to-market losses on their mortgage book totalling 
US$ 35.2 billion which they have not realized in their income account (because they 
believe these reflect liquidity conditions which are temporary and do not imply a 
                                                 
24 And that is according to the GAAP conventions. At fair value, FRE’s liabilities actually exceeded its 
assets by early 2008, and at fair value the two agencies’ aggregate assets exceeded liabilities by only US$ 7 
billion (CBO, 2008). The agencies also placed considerable value on deferred tax write-offs to which they 
were entitled, but whose realization would require them to make sizable profits.  Their valuation 
procedures for delinquent loans were also relaxed in 2007-8 again flattering their accounts. 
25 The agencies’ accounts make no attempt to estimate the net effect.  FNMA lost over $4 billion on its 
derivatives portfolio in 2007 but it is not stated how much of this merely offset interest rate-related gains in 
the fair value of the remainder of its portfolio. 
  28probability of default).  Since the reporting date of end-July, the agencies acknowledge a 
further worsening in the risk of credit losses. Adding the realized and unrealized losses 
we get a total in excess of US$ 50 billion lost in 18 months – only 1 per cent of the 
mortgage book, but well over ¾ of the shareholders’ funds at end-2006! 
 
This was not apparently the result of unknowingly acquiring a more toxic part of a 
structure than expected.  The models employed seem to have simply understated the 
plausible range of loan loss rates on a portfolio of mortgages. All of the elaborate models 
constructed to hedge the prepayment and other structure-related risks have proved an 
irrelevancy relative to the simple move of mortgage defaults outside the historic range.  It 
is not clear how a mechanical model could have improved over a historically-informed 
sense of the potential for risks to arise in unexpected places.   
 
The overall range of plausible losses that will ultimately be borne by the two GSEs 
remains wide.  On July 22, 2008 the US Congressional Budget Office (2008) released its 
calculations of the possible draws that might be made on US Government funds to 
insulate creditors of the GSEs from loss and thereby ensure systemic financial stability.  
Their estimate was in a range from zero to US$ 100 billion, with an expected value of 
US$ 25 billion. 
 
Legislation to enable the US Treasury to commit such funds was enacted at that time, and 
on September 7, 2008 action was initiated to inject funds.  On that day the two firms 
were taken into the Conservatorship of their new regulator the Federal Housing Finance 
  29Agency (FHFA); dividend payments were suspended and the CEOs replaced. At the 
same time the Treasury (i) injected US$1 billion and received senior preferred shares 
carrying a 10 per cent coupon and warrants for 80 per cent of the two firms’ common 
stock with a nominal exercise price; (ii) undertook to make good any future capital 
shortfall as determined by FHFA in accordance with US GAAP (i.e. ensuring compliance 
with a zero capital adequacy requirement); (iii) started a program of acquiring agency-
backed MBS in the market. In addition, the two firms were given access to a new 
liquidity facility at the Fed.  
 
Given the drastic perceived consequences by a wide range of authoritative 
commentators
26 of a default on agency paper, in terms of market turbulence, political 
fallout (given the large foreign official holdings of GSEs), and the functioning of the 
mortgage market,
27 the US Government’s action to step in was all but inevitable. The 
technique used minimized formal disruptions: thus the Government did not formally take 
over all of the firms’ debt, nor were the firms closed and liquidated.  Shareholders were 
diluted by 80 per cent and dividends frozen; although their share prices had already fallen 
more than 90 per cent from their peak, they suffered a further sharp fall immediately after 
the announcement to about 1 per cent of their peak value. The inevitability of the 
intervention and the open-ended nature of the government’s liability in this condition 
confirms that the regulatory model used allowed these firms to operate on far too thin a 
                                                 
26 Recent speeches and op-ed pieces by Summers, Greenspan, Krugman and the Chinese central banker Yu 
Yongding may be mentioned in support of this claim, 
27 Whether the US mortgage market really needed the agencies has long been debated.  Estimates in the 
literature suggest it has probably helped lower the cost of conforming mortgages by up to 25 basis points 
(Eisenbeis et al., 2007).  But there is little evidence that increases in their purchases of non-conforming 
assets affect mortgage rates or spreads (Lehnert et al., 2005).  Other industrial countries rely on other forms 
of subsidy to support home ownership and none has closely imitated the US model . 
  30cushion of capital.  It remained unclear why tighter regulation had not been imposed 
earlier: close supervision of the agencies’ complex activities and limitations on their 
assumption of additional risk would be the conventional regulatory guidance for such 
entities. But because of their perceived role in sustaining mortgage availability, the GSEs 
actually saw a relaxation in capital adequacy requirements and risk-taking in early 2008, 
and they had responded by increasing their portfolio of mortgage-backed securities since 
this relaxation. 
 
If the GSEs had a rationale in the new century, it was that mortgage banking remained 
fragmented and the main participants did not have the scale or geographical range to 
diversify credit risks and to lay-off pre-payment and other risks.  These risks could be 
laid-off using financial engineering, but a large share of this engineering was captured by 
just two intermediaries thanks to the implicit government guarantee which they enjoyed. 
Inadequate risk modelling allowed regulators to tolerate capital levels so low that they 
have now triggered what is likely to become a sizable call on that implicit guarantee.
28  
 
3.  Naïve belief in the perfection of models and markets – different dimensions 
 
Exaggerated belief in the precision  of mechanical risk models induced the world’s top 
financial institutions to bypass common-sense precautions.  How else could they have 
ignored the evident conflicts of interest involved in originate-to-sell or assumed the 
enormous credit exposure they took to an entirely new line of business, the sub-prime 
                                                 
28 The blanket government guarantee of the liabilities all six main Irish-owned banks on September 30, 
2008 was triggered by market concern over the property-related portfolio of these institutions, given falling 
property prices in Ireland and the UK. 
  31mortgage and its close relatives.  Exaggerated extrapolation of improved financial market 
efficiency into a naïve belief (also perhaps based on a supposed perfectibility of 
institutional risk-management) of ultra-liquidity induced others to act as if perfect 
liquidity was indefinitely assured.   
 
Modelling of many different types of process crucial to assessing risk have proved 
defective. 
 
Most fundamentally, models of house-price movements and of the relation between 
negative loan-to-value ratios and borrower default.  As house prices continue to fall, the 
degree to which intermediary and rating agency assumptions on key parameters here 
were inadequate is becoming increasingly important as the explanation for the scale of 
overall losses.  Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) present regression analysis showing 
that – after adjusting for observable loan and borrower characteristics, a trend rise in 
delinquency rates should by 2005 have clearly pointed to a broad deterioration of 
underwriting quality that ought to have been factored-in to ratings.  Calomiris (2008) 
suggests that extrapolation of previous default experience should have made it clear to 
specialists that the assumptions built into MBS ratings were based assumptions that 
(even ignoring the dramatic expansion of subprime lending in 2005-6) were 
overoptimistic, but that they continued to use them because of distorted agency 
incentives.   
 
  32Models of tranche risk in securitizations are also a complex area which has been usually 
left to the ratings agencies.  Mason and Rosner (2007) provide a good account of some of 
the complexities here and in particular how they interact with rating agency incentives.  
We have already alluded to the contrasting impact of unexpectedly high correlation of 
underlying mortgage values: the potentially dramatic increase in default risk on senior 
tranches (and reduction on junior tranches) undermine pricing and create considerable 
risk for entities that have opted for high volume–low spread business model using the 
senior tranches.  
 
Models of short-term interest rate spreads underestimated the degree to which the 
marginal cost of wholesale funds to intermediaries could deviate from risk-free rates.  
Firms such as NR and Sachsen had business models which required more stable spreads; 
the higher market-wide spreads that emerged and persisted made these business models 
loss-making to an extent sufficient to wipe-out capital. (Recognizing this, the market ran 
from, or refused to refinance, those and some other intermediaries, accelerating their 
failure; but they were doomed by the wider spread).  More complex reliance on models 
of interest rate spreads caused problems elsewhere, as in the hedge fund Carlyle Capital 
discussed below. 
 
More acutely, most models in use have not embodied the possibility of money markets 
simply not clearing.  (The experience of the Auction-traded securities market in the US 
in February 2008 makes it clear that this can happen even when credit risk is not an 
issue).  
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Prepayment risk has always been recognized as important in the financing of fixed rate 
mortgages and hard-to-model, given that it depends on such factors as housing market 
turnover and the ease with which borrowers can secure refinancing. Despite the huge 
efforts that have gone into modelling static and dynamic hedging strategies (using 
derivatives) that transactions cost with the reduction of exposure to prepayment risk, this 
does not seem to have been the dominant factor in causing losses this time around. 
 
Some firms have failed because derivatives strategies misfired.  A high-profile case is the 
hedge fund Carlyle Capital Corporation, which defaulted on the bulk of its US$20 billion 
debt on March 12, 2008, just a couple of days before Bear Stearns (which was one of its 
creditors).  It has sometimes been suggested in market commentary that Carlyle CC was 
the victim of widening spreads on GSE obligations as if it was a victim of weakening 
market confidence in agency debt.  However, the story (as described in the firm’s Annual 
Report published less than a month before it failed) is quite different.  In fact, by early 
2008, Carlyle CC’s assets were almost entirely in AAA-rated GSE bonds issued as part 
of the GSE’s management of interest rate risk at floating rates, but with an interest rate 
cap.  This cap generated a higher running yield on the bonds (because the cap was never 
reached), but the cost of the embedded option implicit in the cap increased sharply with 
the increase in both the level and volatility of money market rates from August 2007 on.  
Because of its high leverage and concentrated holdings of these bonds with an average 
maturity of 4-5 years, the capital loss thus imposed on Carlyle CC was sufficient to drive 
it into insolvency. As Carlyle CC was a hedge fund and not a bank, it would be wrong to 
  34say that their model was flawed – just highly risky and likely more so than they realized 
based on their modelling. Here the major losers were hedge fund equity investors: large 
creditors were substantially insulated by holding the collateral. 
 
Contract risk, such as arises in Credit Default Swaps is another area in which model error 
from oversimplification is often seen. Two excellent examples are provided by 
Morgenson (2008a and b).  Her first example shows how the informality of 
undocumented understandings can dramatically alter the payout of these complex 
instruments; the second, shows how sellers of protection against GSE default might 
suffer from a bailout: if dividend payments to preferred shareholders are suspended in a 
bailout of fixed interest creditors, then this credit event would likely trigger payment of 
credit default protection. 
 
(Lack of transparency adds to modelling difficulties, though as discussed by Allen and 
Gale, 2007; and Adrian and Shin, 2007, under some circumstances too much 
transparency can amplify cascade effects on confidence accelerating systemic collapse.) 
 
4. Containment and resolution 
A large literature has grown up on containment and resolution policies in banking crises, 
drawing not only on historic experience of advanced economies but also from the 
numerous and costly events experienced over the past three decades in developing 
countries (cf. Honohan and Laeven, 2005).  The IMF and the World Bank established a 
financial sector assessment program in which most of the IFI membership (though not 
  35yet the US) has already participated and which focuses on evaluating and advising on 
financial stability policies including crisis management policies.
29  So how has actual 
practice in this crisis with regard to failing banks matched-up to the “best practice” 
emerging from this large effort?  I am going to abstract entirely once again from 
systemwide issues of policy on policy interest rates and on terms and conditions for 
access to refinancing facilities, confining myself to a brief discussion of failure cases. 
 
I will comment on whether action was speedy or whether there was forbearance, on 
moral hazard aspects of intervention affecting equity and management and finally look at 
the fiscal costs as they are emerging. 
 
Speed of action or forbearance? 
The importance of speedy action in containment is stressed by many.  Dramatic weekend 
and even mid-week action has characterized several of the official interventions in this 
crisis, including those at Sachsen, Northern Rock, IKB, Bear Stearns. Indymac and 
Roskilde.  With the exception of the last-named, however, these were all collapses driven 
by illiquidity which needed some immediate response.
30   
 
At another level, though, it could be argued that intervention was too slow even in some 
of these cases.  Sachsen Bank’s Dublin operations were causing anxiety to the regulator 
                                                 
29 As well as on financial development issues in the case of developing countries. 
30 There has been a debate over whether a more speedy and comprehensive official response to the retail 
depositor run on Northern Rock would have been helpful (House of Commons, 2008).  Only a few days are 
at issue here, though, and there is little indication that the end-result for the institution or for the system as 
a whole would have been much different one way or another if the action eventually taken had been 
brought forward by a few days. 
  36of its German parent as far ago as August 2004.  Roskilde Bank, intervened in August 
2008, has also been under a cloud for some time.  And of course issues surrounding 
Freddie and Fannie have been discussed for years. 
 
An interesting feature of the crisis has been the irrelevance or ineffectiveness of deposit 
insurance schemes; either they have not covered the institutions or depositors concerned, 
and do not seem to have precluded even insured depositor withdrawals.   
 
Equity shareholders 
By and large, equity shareholders were hit quite hard in these failures, until the last few 
days in September.  Indymac and WaMu shareholders will probably get nothing (with 
heavy losses also for subordinated debt holders), and the same is true for Roskilde Bank.  
We don’t know how much the Northern Rock shareholders will get, but since the 
independent valuation is intended to price the shares on the basis that no liquidity support 
from the Bank of England would have been available, the price is likely to be very low.  
Bear Stearns shareholders certainly looked as if they might even have a below-fair-value 
payoff imposed on them at first, and the price finally agreed was not high.  GSE share 
prices have lost 98-99 per cent of their value of a year or so before the intervention.  
About 90 per cent of this had happened before intervention, at which stage the share 
value was supported mainly by the prospect that the inevitable intervention would not 
involve equity dilution. 
 
  37It might be thought that this aspect didn’t matter for the two German banks since they 
were public sector entities, but allocation of resources between different agencies within 
the public sector is not without real consequences.  Thus, for example, we note that the 
Danish National Bank is seeking indemnification from the Danish Government for any 
losses arising out of its equity investment in Roskilde Bank. 
 
Shareholders can resist low offers and that is one of the main reasons why legislation 
providing for special insolvency arrangements is especially helpful for effective 
intervention and resolution.  The lack of a special resolution regime for UK banks 
hampered the speed of intervention there and is somewhat surprising given the emphasis 
on the necessary power of supervisors in closing and unhealthy bank set out in Basel 
Core Principle 22 adopted (especially for the guidance of developing country 
policymakers) as long ago as 1997.  This is now being corrected. 
 
Despite shareholder losses, banks with a continuing franchise have succeeded in securing 
new equity investment.  Sachsen and IKB have been sold by the initial rescuing agency 
and the bulk of their client base and product lines will continue. UBS, like other major 
banks, has been able to tap new or traditional sources of equity.  Not all failing entities 
are in this happy position: Northern Rock’s lack of deposit resources and its heavy 
reliance on the contestable and currently depressed residential mortgage market made it 
unattractive for buyers and it is being severely downscaled in government ownership. 
 
Management 
  38Here the story is somewhat more mixed and will in time deserve a fuller treatment.  
Many senior managers and directors of failing banks were removed.  But one would have 
to go well beyond a simple count to assess whether a good balance was struck between 
(on the one hand) retaining experienced people and (on the other) disciplining 
underperformance and breaking dysfunctional customer links. Top management of the 
two German banks was changed quickly and compensation was negligible.  Northern 
Rock’s CEO’s pension and compensation (one year’s base pay) gave rise to some 
criticism, but appear to have been set in his contract of employment.  Compensation for 
the departing CEOs of Freddie and Fannie are understood to be considerably more lavish. 
 
Of course, this does not speak to the question of incentives more widely, including for 
banks that didn’t fail.  The unsatisfactory situation here, with boards struggling to 
balance the need to incentivise key staff with packages that offer security as well as gain, 




Table 2 presents a structure within which estimates of the fiscal cost of the crisis can be 
structured.  So far, the figures for banks that have actually had concrete government 
assistance – tentative as they are – seem surprisingly low for a crisis that has been 
described as the worst since the Second World War.  My latest estimates (Honohan, 
2008) of median fiscal cost of 78 systemic crises 1970-2006 was 15.5 per cent of national 
GDP.  Expressing the US$126 billion figure as a percentage of US plus European 
  39Economic Area GDP on the grounds that the losses have been spread across at least the 
banking systems of at least all of these regions produces a figure of less than ½ per cent 
of GDP. 
 
The categories are more defensible than the exact numbers in the table.  Only a few cases 
can be said to have crystallized: limited uncertainty remains with regard to the US$15 bn 
allowed for IKB and Sachsen bank, given their sale back to strong banks with defined 
guarantees.  The FDIC cost (we take it as a public cost even though FDIC’s fund is 
generated from insurance premia) amounts to $10 billion, of which $9 billion relates to 
Indymac.  Interestingly, there was no FDIC cost to the closure in September 2008 of the 
much larger WaMu (Washington Mutual); it was insolvent when intervened, but the 
insured deposits were transferred to JP Morgan Chase, and the franchise value of the 
branches and assets generated enough cash in the resolution to pay off the uninsured 
depositors (though not all creditors). 
 
For the nationalized Northern Rock we have entered HM Treasury’s injection of £3.4 
billion in equity; for Bradford and Bingley are included the deposit insurance payout of 
£14 billion and the UK Treasury’s cash outlay of £4 billion.  In principle, some of this 
could be recovered if loan recoveries are high.  For Fortis we included all of the 
September equity injections. The figure for the NY Fed’s non-recourse financing of the 
Bear Stearn’s transaction is pure conjecture: the Fed might even profit from this deal in 
the end even if the mid-March valuations of the collateral prove reasonable.  The AIG 
loan could easily add US$ 15 billion in losses to the Fed. The amount of losses that 
  40might arise from collateralized lending already made by Central Banks can be gauged by 
reference to the figures which are high: around €450 billion by the ECB and over 
US$400 billion by the Fed system one way or another.  These are overcollateralized 
loans, though the quality of the collateral being presented has likely deteriorated (cf. 
Buiter, 2008).  On the other hand this lending is mainly with recourse: losses will only 
arise in respect of borrowers that fail. 
 
One reason why the figures in the table are so (relatively) low is that the losses from 
subprime were very broadly spread across many of the World’s largest banks as well as 
other financial institutions and funds.  The aggregate capitalization of these institutions 
was big enough to absorb hundreds of billions of losses, and their diversified businesses 
and franchise value remained intact, allowing most of these institutions to recapitalize at 
least partially, tapping funds that had not been hit. 
 
The second reason is that some of the fiscal losses had not yet been identified as of 
Septemnber 2008.  If US and other housing prices were not to fall any further, it might be 
plausible to suppose that much of the losses embedded in mortgage-backed securities 
have already been recognized.  But house prices in the US and several other economies 
show little sign of stabilizing, giving cause for concern that a second wave of losses, 
extending to prime mortgages could be in the offing.  Such losses would likely be 
concentrated in mortgage lenders. Furthermore, a broad and protracted economic 
downturn, to which the credit crunch could be contributing, will itself exacerbate losses 
  41in other segments.  If so, the authorities may suffer extensive further costs of intervening 
other banks. 
 
Practitioner experience with systemic crises around the world suggests that early 
estimates of loss in a systemic crisis underestimate the total, but that they subsequently 
overshoot.  It is not clear where we are in this cycle.  However, the shift at end-
September, 2008 to open-bank rescue schemes of one sort or another promise to increase 
the government’s share of the total loss burden.  For example, the US Government’s US$ 
700 billion mortgage-related asset purchase scheme (proposed on September 19
th , 2008, 
but rejected by Congress) provided few safeguards against the likelihood that 
government would absorb a higher-than-necessary share of the costs.  The difficulty of 
limiting the fiscal costs of adverse selection in such a scheme (buying bad assets from 
going concern banks), suggest that net costs could be high, as they have been in other 
countries (70-80 per cent of the gross outlays for similar schemes in China – admittedly a 
special case). 
 
Given this shift to open-bank assistance, it would not now be a surprise if total fiscal 
costs ended up as high as $400 billion – still only a little over 1 per cent of the GDP of 




  4215 years ago, Robert Merton (1994) cautioned; “The mathematics of [hedging] models 
are precise, but the models are not, being only approximations to the complex, real 
world. Their accuracy as a useful approximation to that world varies considerably across 
time and place. The practitioner should therefore apply the models only tentatively, 
assessing their limitations carefully in each application.”  As Merton (1995) also points 
out whereas equity capital is a wonderful all-purpose risk absorber it is costly; on the 




If we know where our risks are coming from we can, nowadays, find a market in which 
those risks may be hedged, thereby releasing capital that would otherwise have been 
required.  But if we overestimate our ability to foresee the precise nature and scale of the 
risks which we face, and as a result overestimate the extent to which our hedges reduce 
the need for general purpose capital, then we may be in trouble.  Our hedge fails and we 
may have made no back-up provision—after all, saving on capital was the point of the 
hedge.  
 
                                                 
31 “The management of risk has traditionally focussed on capital. Equity capital is the 'cushion' for 
absorbing risks of the institution. It is a wonderful, all-purpose cushion. Why? Because management need 
not know what the source of the unanticipated loss is. They do not have to predict the source of loss, 
because equity protects the firm against all forms of risk; it is in that sense an all-purpose 
cushion and thus it is very attractive for managing risk. As we all know, equity capital also can be quite 
expensive for exactly that reason…The other fundamental means for controlling risk is through hedging. In 
contrast to equity capital which is all purpose, hedging is a form of risk control 
that is very targeted... To hedge, the firm must not only specify what kind of risk it is hedging but also the 
exact quantity of that risk. Hedging is a form of risk control that can be very efficient as a substitute for 
equity capital but it carries with it the requirement that its users have a deep quantitative understanding of 
their business. They must understand much more about their structures than in the case of all-purpose 
equity capital.” Merton (1995) 
  43Each of the banks studied failed – or at least got a bad fright – because their models of 
the risks to which they were subject proved to be too sanguine.  The banks with the 
biggest reported losses did not fail because their businesses was diversified and included 
profit streams and capital reserves from other lines that were not affected by the 
mortgage-related problems. 
 
Risk management textbooks are replete with advice on the need for holistic assessments 
avoiding silos and involving a fundamental look-through approach.
32  But it is clear from 
the pattern revealed by these failures that the implications for discretion as opposed to 
rules, for overall judgment as an override on mechanical models, has not been fully taken 
on board whether by intermediary managements or by prudential regulators.   
                                                 
32 Recent reports by IIF (2008) and BIS (2008) reiterate these familiar but widely ignored counsels. 
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  49Table 1: Some Key Financials for the Four Cases 
 
US$ billion  Sachsen Bank 
Northern 
Rock  UBS GSEs 
        
End-2006 Total assets including relevant off-balance  109.6  198.0  1924.0  4352.9 
End-2006 Total assets on balance sheet  82.2  198.0  1924.0  1648.8 
End-2006 Shareholders' equity  1.9  3.3  40.8  70.9 
   Leverage  58 59  47  61 
Reported credit-related losses 2007 and 2008H1  2.3  1.7  44.0  16.3 
Additional likely losses  1.3  2.5  0.0  35.2 
Maximum official credit line reached 22.6  55.9  0.0  0.0 
Government solvency support  3.6  6.7  0.0  25.0 
 
Exchange rate conversion for all figures is at end-2006 exchange rates. 
GSEs refers to FNMA and FHLMC only. 
“Additional likely losses” refers to relevant figures reported by the institutions or their owners, but not yet recognized 
in accounts – ultimate losses can be expected to differ; perhaps by a large amount. 
Government solvency support: for Sachsen this is the first loss guarantee provided by the State of Saxony in respect of 
the Super-SIV; for Northern Rock it is the additional £3.4 billion in equity to be injected as announced in August 2008; 
for the GSEs it is the CBOs expected cost estimate for future support. 
 
 
Table 2:  Acknowledged Fiscal Costs of Identified Bank Failures Jan 2007 to Sep 2008 
 
     US$  bn  Basis     
(a) Identified institutions            
  Equity injections   Fortis  16     NLD/BEL/LUX Government equity 
   IKB  11   KfW Statement    
   Dexia  9     FRA/BEL/LUX Public sector equity 
    Bradford & Bingley  7    Dep Prot. pay to Abbey/Santander 
   Northern  Rock  7     Government equity   
   Sachsen  4     Total Government shield 
   Glitnir  1     ISL Govt equity  
   Roskilde  1     Danish National Bank equity 
  Dep Insur payouts  Bradford & Bingley  26     Government pay to Abbey/Santander 
   IndyMac  9    FDIC     
    15 other FDIC  1     FDIC + Wachovia assets exposure 
  Intended fiscal support  FNM & FRE  25     Congressional Budget Office 
   Hypo  RE  ??    DEU Govt liquidity guar up to $63 bn 
    Ireland 6 banks  ??     Blanket guarantee of liabilities 
  Central bank collateral  Bear Stearns  4     ? Loss on NY Fed $29 bn facility 
   AIG  15    Scale indicated by interest premium 
   Others  ??    Relaxation of collateral standards 
(b) Future failing institutions          
(c) Asset purchases from going concerns       US scheme proposed Sep 19, 2008 
(d) Distressed borrower assistance        
Overall total   135++        
 
Note: Only covers assistance announced or provided by September 30, 2008.   indicates direction of likely revision in 
this number.  More on the basis of the figures: Fortis, Dexia, NR, Roskilde and Glitnir the full equity injection is used 
without subtracting the pre-injection share price. B&B total government outlay to Abbey/Santander not accounting for 
any net recovery on the rump.
  50Figure 1:  Reported and Plausible Total Losses as % of Initial Shareholder Equity 
Selected Institutions, 2007-8. 
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